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A popular model for the representation of time in the brain posits the existence of a single,
central-clock. In that framework, temporal distortions in perception are explained by con-
tracting or expanding time over a given interval.We here present evidence for an alternative
account, one which proposes multiple independent timelines coexisting within the brain
and stresses the importance of motor predictions and causal inferences in constructing
our temporal representation of the world. Participants judged the simultaneity of a beep
and flash coming from a single source at different distances. The beep was always pre-
sented at a constant delay after a motor action, while the flash occurred at a variable delay.
Independent shifts in the implied timing of the auditory stimulus toward the motor action
(but not the visual stimulus) provided evidence against a central-clock model. Additionally,
the hypothesis that the time between action and delayed effect is compressed (known as
intentional binding) seems unable to explain our results: firstly, because actions and effects
can perceptually reverse, and secondly because the recalibration of simultaneity remains
even after the participant’s intentional actions are no longer present. Contrary to previous
reports, we also find that participants are unable to use distance cues to compensate for
the relatively slower speed of sound when audio-visual events are presented in depth.
When a motor act is used to control the distal event, however, adaptation to the delayed
auditory signal occurs and subjective cross-sensory synchrony is maintained.These results
support the hypothesis that perceptual timing derives from and is calibrated by our motor
interactions with the world.
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INTRODUCTION
Brains collect information about the external world through a
variety of sensory systems. However, due to differences in trans-
mission velocities, neural architecture, and processing demands,
these incoming sensory signals become centrally available to the
brain at different points in time (Andreassi and Greco, 1975; Alli-
son et al., 1977; King and Palmer, 1985; Meredith et al., 1987;
Spence and Squire, 2003; King, 2005; Eagleman, 2008). The dis-
crepancies in processing times, occurring on the range of tens
of milliseconds, have real-world implications. For example, when
sprinters line up for the beginning of a race, a gunshot rather than
a visual event is used to signal the start of competition. Although
sound waves travel much slower than light, auditory informa-
tion is processed more rapidly in the brain. Sprinters can thus
react much faster to a bang than a flash. This behavioral fact has
been known for well over a century (Wundt, 1874), and in recent
decades has been corroborated by our knowledge of human phys-
iology: the cells in our auditory cortex can change their firing rate
more quickly in response to a sound than the visual cortex cells
can respond to a light (King and Palmer, 1985).
But comparing the physiology to perception leads to a paradox.
While the sprinter can react at different speeds to the incoming sen-
sory information, perceptually the flash and the bang of the pistol
seem to occur at the same time. Even more striking, for the official
pulling the trigger, the action itself, and even the decision to act,
will also appear synchronous with the sight and sound of the gun-
shot. The volitional and motor signals, generated far in advance of
the sensory effects, are brought into perceptual alignment to pro-
duce a unified and coherent temporal experience. This fact is all
the more perplexing given that humans are capable of detecting
differences in timing as small as 2 ms (Wertheimer, 1912; Hirsh
and Sherrick, 1961; Westheimer and McKee, 1977), far below the
relevant sensory processing delays. What accounts for the sleight
of hand that allows perception to rewrite the timing of its outgoing
motor acts and incoming sensory feedback?
In interactions with the world, one of the fundamental chal-
lenges animals face, crucial both for learning and survival, is that of
determining causality (Michotte, 1963; Waldmann and Holyoak,
1992; Buehner and Cheng, 1997; Pearl, 2000; Scholl and Tremoulet,
2000; Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002; Schulz and Gopnik, 2004;
Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2005; Sloman, 2005; Stetson et al., 2006;
Körding et al., 2007). At its most fundamental level, causality
requires regularity in temporal order judgments; concluding that
event B consistently followed action A. Correctly judging the order
of action and sensation, however, is not an easy task for the brain to
solve, in part because sensory-motor delays are constantly shifting
in relation to one another. For example, as limbs grow through-
out development, more time is required for motor commands to
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travel out and for sensory data to return (Campbell et al., 1981;
Alison et al., 1983). Changing lighting conditions, such as enter-
ing a dimly lit room, cause signals from the retina to be delayed
by up to 100 ms (Matteson, 1971; Purpura et al., 1990). Different
acoustic environments can modulate the perceived arrival time
of sounds (Kinsler et al., 2000). To account for these changing
latencies and ensure proper judgments of causality, the brain must
be able to dynamically adjust its expectations about the tempo-
ral relationship between motor output and incoming sensations
(Stetson et al., 2006; Eagleman, 2008).
While it is clear that it would be useful to calibrate the timing
of motor acts and sensory feedback, the mechanism by which this
is accomplished is not well understood. How would the nervous
system know exactly when to calibrate and under what conditions?
One proposal is that organisms calibrate time perception through
their motor interactions with the world (Stetson et al., 2006; Eagle-
man,2008). This notion has related roots in the literature on spatial
vision (Welch, 1978; Bedford, 1999; O’Regan and Noe, 2001), but
has only recently been explored in relation to time. In spatial vision,
for example, when participants wear left-right inverting prism
glasses, their vision is highly distorted and they are unable to inter-
act appropriately with the world. Objects on the left now appear
on the right. However, if the participant is allowed to interact with
the world (reach out and touch objects), he adapts such that the
object on the left now appears to be on the left again (Kohler, 1951;
Welch, 1978; Redding et al., 1992; Redding and Wallace, 2002). In
other words, the brain can send motor actions out into the world
and use the feedback to calibrate perceptual interpretations of
the world. This calibration of vision allows the brain to maintain
accurate judgments in varied and varying environments.
Analogously, in our framework, an animal can send out a motor
action (say, snapping one’s fingers) and analyze the returning sen-
sations (the resulting feel, sight, and sound) to calibrate the timing
of different modalities. If the animal’s brain were to employ the
simple prior expectation that sensations should follow actions
without delay, then any sensation arriving at a delay could be
brought into temporal alignment. For example if finger-snaps were
consistently followed immediately by the feel and sight of the fin-
gers, but the “click” sound came 100 ms later, auditory processing
could be adjusted until the click was perceived as synchronous
with the other modalities. The temporal alignment of modalities
can subsequently be useful during passive viewing of the world.
Crucial to this equation will be an animal’s ability to recog-
nize which changes in the world it is authoring. A “click” sound
unrelated to the fingers, but instead indicative of a separate event,
does not need to be brought into temporal alignment. According
to several influential theories of motor control, it is our ability
to monitor self-generated actions that allows us to distinguish
the sensory consequences of our own actions from externally
produced sensory stimuli (von Holst, 1954; Jordan and Rumel-
hart, 1992; Jeannerod, 1997; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000).
This monitoring is carried out by a predictive forward model that
can anticipate and identify the sensory consequences of our own
movements. A comparison between predicted and actual sensory
feedback, carried out by a central monitor (Frith, 1992), is what
then allows us to recognize motor actions as our own. Identifying
that the delayed “click” has the anticipated sound of fingers being
snapped is what licenses the brain to claim authorship and shift
the perceived time of the sound closer to the causally related touch,
sight, and action.
As the philosopher David Hume pointed out, making these
types of causal inferences relies upon three empirical cues: tem-
poral priority, constant conjunction, and contiguity in space and
time (Hume, 1748). Experimental results have suggested that the
manipulation of any of these cues can profoundly alter the con-
sequent perceptual experience. For example, precise predictions
about the tactile feedback, both in time and space, are what pre-
vent us from having the capacity to tickle ourselves (Weiskrantz
et al., 1971). However, if the predictability is manipulated, for
example by injecting a temporal delay between the motor action
and the end effect, participants can be fooled into thinking that
another person is tickling them (Blakemore et al., 1999). Ratings
of the intensity of the ticklish sensation vary as a function of the
ability of the motor command to predict precisely the spatial and
temporal position of the resulting sensory feedback (Blakemore
et al., 2000).
Consistent with the hypothesis of recalibration in the time
domain, a rich body of experimental work has recently demon-
strated that the perceived duration between a repeated voluntary
action (pressing a key) and a delayed sensory effect (e.g., seeing
a flash or hearing a beep) is contracted (for reviews see Buehner,
2010; Moore and Obhi, 2012). Two competing hypothesis have
arisen to explain these results. The first, intentional binding, pro-
poses that the brain “contains a specific cognitive module that
binds intentional actions to their effects to construct a coher-
ent conscious experience of our own agency” (Haggard et al.,
2002). In this framework, sensory effects are subjectively “pulled”
toward intentions, such that all sensations following voluntary
action appear closer together in time to the actions (Figure 1A).
This “binding” putatively results from a compression of the per-
ceived time between action and sensation, typically explained by
variations in the rate of pacing signals from an internal clock mech-
anism (Wenke and Haggard, 2009). The durations between action
and sensation appear shorter, on this account, because fewer clock
ticks accumulate during a given interval. Crucially, slowing of an
internal clock depends on a close association between a partic-
ipant’s intentions and the resulting sensory feedback (Haggard
et al., 2002; Haggard and Clark, 2003; Wohlschlager et al., 2003;
Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert et al., 2008; Moore and
Haggard, 2008).
The second account suggests that because of uncertainty (i.e.,
measurement noise) associated with temporal judgments, esti-
mates of causally related events are more likely to be judged
close in time and space than unrelated events (Eagleman and
Holcombe, 2002; Stetson et al., 2006; Buehner and Humphreys,
2009, 2010; Buehner, 2010, 2012). This theory accords with the
results from intentional binding [e.g., people are most confident
that events caused by themselves are causally related (Stetson et al.,
2006)], but also predicts attraction for causally linked events out-
side of one’s own control (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002). Recent
experimental work has supported that hypothesis, showing tim-
ing shifts when observing another person perform a causal action
(Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007), for
joint causal actions (Strother et al., 2010; Obhi and Hall, 2011), for
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FIGURE 1 | Intentional binding vs. motor-sensory recalibration.
Schematic illustration of perceived timing following adaptation to a
repeated voluntary action and a delayed auditory effect. (A) Intentional
Binding suggests sensory consequences are pulled toward intentions and
that the phenomenon is explained by the slowing of an internal clock.
Delayed auditory effects are drawn closer to actions because subjective
time contracts. (B) Motor-sensory Recalibration proposes multiple
independent timelines and highlights the flexibility and uncertainty
inherent in a causal understanding of the world. The theory predicts an
illusory reversal of action and effect in the unisensory case. (C) If
subjective duration contracts between actions and effects, simultaneously
presented auditory and visual stimuli should shift in unison toward the
action. Therefore, simultaneity judgments between the beep and the flash
should not change in relation to one another. (D) Contrary to the
intentional binding model, motor-sensory recalibration predicts an
independent auditory temporal shift in multi-sensory timing. The timing of
the flash does not shift because it is not presented at a predictable delay,
but instead varies in time.
intra-sensory and cross-sensory causally linked events (Haggard
and Clark, 2003; Stetson et al., 2006), for non-intentional mechan-
ical causation (Buehner, 2012), and spatial causal binding when
no motor planning or intentional action is present (Buehner and
Humphreys, 2010; but see Cravo et al., 2009).
Because of the importance of voluntary actions in causal
inferences, our hypothesis stresses an active recalibration of the
expected timing relationships between outgoing motor acts and
resultant sensory signals (Stetson et al., 2006). In this motor-
sensory recalibration hypothesis, timing expectations in different
modalities (e.g., sensory and motor systems) can shift in rela-
tion to one another. In other words, the expectations of how long
an action should take to go out, and the expectation of how long
sensory feedback should take to return, undergoes dynamic adjust-
ment based on interaction with the world. The injection of a delay
violates the expectation that causally related sensory events should
occur without delay, and therefore the timing of the system shifts.
Stetson et al. (2006) illustrated a striking prediction of this theory:
after adaptation to a delay between a button press and flash, a flash
presented immediately (and unexpectedly) after a button press
will seem to occur before the action itself (Figure 1B). It is crucial
to note this illusory reversal of action and sensation is incompat-
ible with the intentional binding framework: effects “bound” to
their intentions would not occur before the intentions themselves;
instead, they would merely draw closer together in time. Simi-
larly, it is difficult to see how a clock-rate model could account
for a subjective interval turning negative. Despite these concerns,
intentional binding and the clock-rate model remain a common
interpretation of the phenomenon (see Moore and Obhi, 2012).
In the present study we perform a series of experiments to
distinguish between these two hypotheses. Specifically, we test
whether recalibration can occur separately and independently
along different sensory channels. Studies in this field have gener-
ally focused on perceptual timing when a single uni-modal event
follows a motor action (Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard and Clark,
2003; Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Stetson et al., 2006; Engbert et al.,
2007, 2008; Moore and Haggard, 2008; Heron et al., 2009; Sugano
et al., 2010). While there are numerous studies on cross-modal
recalibration (Spence and Squire, 2003; Sugita and Suzuki, 2003;
Fujisaki et al., 2004;Vroomen et al., 2004; Navarra et al., 2009, 2007;
Hanson et al., 2008; Keetels and Vroomen, 2008), only one to our
knowledge has examined cross-sensory timing adaptation when a
participant’s own motor actions are involved (Cravo et al., 2011).
We reason that if subjective duration contracts between actions
and effects (intentional binding), then simultaneously presented
auditory and visual stimuli should shift in unison toward the
action (Figure 1C), and therefore simultaneity judgments between
the beep and the flash should be unchanged in the presence or
absence of the motor action. On the other hand, if motor output
calibrates timing expectations for vision and audition indepen-
dently (motor-sensory recalibration model), then these senses will
change their perceived timing relationship with each other – but
only when a participant’s own motor actions trigger the events
(Figure 1D). To distinguish these outcomes, we had participants
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judge the simultaneity of audio-visual pairings in active and pas-
sive conditions – that is when the participant triggers a beep and
flash with a key press, or the computer triggers the events.
Additionally, we had participants make simultaneity judgments
at different distances from the stimuli. At distances greater than
30 m, sight and sound appear unsynchronized (when you observe
a woodchopper at a distance, the fall of the axe appears to precede
the sound) – but an unexplored question is this: if you consistently
controlled the distant woodchopper with your own motor action,
would that cause the sight and sound to become perceptually syn-
chronized? Note this is a simple but novel paradigm that has no
embodiment in the natural world: normally, objects beyond your
arms reach (and especially at a distance greater than 30 m) are
beyond operant control. In this study we leverage operant inter-
actions with distant objects to unmask how sensory signals are
integrated normally; this also allows us to address an unresolved
debate concerning how distance cues are utilized in perceptual
judgments (Engel and Dougherty, 1971; Stone et al., 2001; Spence
and Squire, 2003; Sugita and Suzuki, 2003; Kopinska and Harris,
2004; Lewald and Guski, 2004; Alais and Carlile, 2005; Arnold et al.,
2005; Harrar and Harris, 2005; Heron et al., 2007).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
STIMULI
The testing apparatus consisted of a wireless trigger device (trans-
mitter) and a wireless stimulus device (receiver) that triggers an
independently timed flash and beep. We call this apparatus the
“clapboard,” named after the device used in the movie industry
to produce simultaneous visual and auditory events for later syn-
chronization. The clapboard’s transmitter, which was connected
to the testing computer, was responsible for wirelessly sending the
stimulus “go” code along with the stimulus parameters on each
trial. This was accomplished by a signal sent from the computer
to the transmitter (in the Passive condition), or by a push-button
attached to the transmitter itself (in the Active condition).
The clapboard’s receiver consisted of a microcontroller capa-
ble of wireless transmission. The microcontroller was also con-
nected to a LED light and a speaker (model: Event 20/20BAS,
260 mm× 375 mm× 310 mm), which it was responsible for con-
trolling. Both the microcontroller and LED flash sat atop the
speaker. These “real-world” stimuli (i.e., an actual flash and bang
at a distance) circumvented a confound inherent in some previous
studies (Dixon and Spitz, 1980; Sugita and Suzuki, 2003), in which
participants wore headphones while watching a visual display at
a distance. That can be a problem because it introduces pollution
from a related effect, “spatial ventriloquism” (Spence and Squire,
2003; Zampini et al., 2003).
Each trial consisted of a flash (∼650 cd, 30 ms duration) fol-
lowed or preceded by a beep (80 dB, 550 Hz, 30 ms duration).
Following the trigger signal, the beep arrived at the participant’s
ears at a fixed delay of ∼210 ms (200 ms+wireless latency, taking
into account the speed of sound as a function of stimulus distance).
The wireless turnaround transmission latency (from button press
to triggering the stimulus) was <15 ms (<8 ms one-way). The
flash occurred from 200 ms before (referred to as “−200”ms) to
200 ms after the beep in 50 ms increments (nine possible stimulus
combinations; Figure 2A).
FIGURE 2 | Experimental design. (A) Participants judged whether a beep
and a flash were simultaneous or successive. The beep always arrived at
the participant ∼210 ms after a trigger signal was received at the
“clapboard,” a device which generates a beep and a flash. On a given trial, a
flash could occur within a 200 ms window around the beep at nine possible
offsets (multiples of 50 ms). Zero millisecond corresponds to when the
beep and the flash physically arrived at the participant at the same time. (B)
The beep/flash pair was either presented randomly in a 4 s window after the
last response (Passive), or triggered by the participant by a button press
(Active). (C)The beep and the flash were presented at two different
distance conditions: Near (clapboard receiver located 0.5 m from
participant) or Far (30 m from participant). Stimulus arrival times at the
participant were held constant in the Near and Far conditions (i.e., the
slower speed of sound was taken into account so that offsets represent the
physical arrival time of the signals at the participant).
PROCEDURE
Fifteen trials were recorded at each offset pairing, yielding a total
of 135 stimulus presentations per block. The ordering of trials was
randomized for each participant.
Participants ran both a Passive and an Active block (Figure 2B).
In the Passive block, the beep and the flash occurred randomly
within a 4 s window following a participant’s answer from the
previous trial. In the Active block, participants triggered an event
using a push-button that wirelessly transmitted a signal to the clap-
board. Immediately following the cross-modal event, participants
judged whether the beep and the flash were simultaneous or suc-
cessive by recording their response on a keypad. The distribution
of the relative timing between the flash and the beep were iden-
tical in the two blocks – the only difference is that the flash/beep
was a direct result of the participant’s motor act in the operant
(Active) case.
We also tested two distance conditions. In the Near condition
(0.5 m, Figure 2C), participants were seated in a psychophysical
testing room. Light levels were normalized to match the lumi-
nance of a lit corridor used in the Far condition (30 m, Figure 2C).
The corridor in the Far condition afforded abundant visual and
auditory cues for estimating distance. The flash luminance was
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 46 | 4
Parsons et al. Motor-sensory recalibration of cross-modal events
∼650 cd; both the perceived luminance and size of the flash were
matched between the two distance conditions. Sound volume was
also matched to∼80 dB.
Before running the experiment, participants were required to
pass a training version of the Passive task. They then completed a
Passive block of trials (Block 1), followed by an Active block sec-
ond. We fixed this order of presentation because our initial pilot
experiments demonstrated that motor-sensory timing recalibra-
tion from an Active block can carry over for tens of trials into
a subsequent Passive block. This aftereffect will be demonstrated
and quantified by our experiments below, in which we had a subset
of participants complete a third block, this time in the Passive con-
dition (Figure 5). That third block will allow us to independently
investigate the persistence of aftereffects in the absence of action.
PARTICIPANTS
At each distance condition [Near (0.5 m) or Far (30 m)], a set
of 18 participants participated in both Passive and Active blocks
(Figure 2). Six of the participants participated at both distance
conditions. Additionally, 10 of the participants from the Near con-
dition completed a third block (Passive) to assess the persistence
of adaptation effects (Figure 5). Participants were between the
ages of 18 and 45 with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
no known hearing loss. All participants consented to the study
as approved by the Institutional Review Board at Baylor Col-
lege of Medicine, and were compensated for taking part in the
experiment.
RESULTS
MOTOR-SENSORY RECALIBRATION
Shift in the auditory timeline
Using simultaneity judgments as a measure of cross-modal tim-
ing, we found a replication of the phenomenon of motor-sensory
recalibration: a beep occurring at a predicable delay of 210 ms
after a motor action was perceived as occurring earlier in time
(Figures 3A,B). Shifts in participants’ points of subjective simul-
taneity (PSS) between the Active and Passive conditions were
−18 ms [t (17)=−3.50,p< 0.01] in the Near location and−25 ms
[t (17)=−4.04, p< 0.01] in the Far location. These are compara-
ble to what has been observed in previous experiments with single
modality events following motor actions (Haggard et al., 2002;
Stetson et al., 2006) and parallel the results obtained in a recent
study of motor-triggered cross-sensory timing (Cravo et al., 2011).
However, we note that methodological differences between the
Cravo et al. (2011) paper and our study, including explicit adapta-
tion to the action event (instead of our implicit method), potential
aftereffects induced by mixed ordering of conditions (instead of
our fixed ordering), and a longer interval between action and sen-
sory consequences (300 vs. 210 ms, personal communication), may
have contributed to differences in the size and nature of the effect
across the two studies.
Notably, the shifts in our experiment were not accompa-
nied by a significant difference between the number of simul-
taneity judgments made in the Active and Passive conditions
(Figures 3A,B inset ). Simultaneity judgments, while limiting the
effects of response bias, are susceptible to changes in criterion
for what is classified as simultaneous (Zampini et al., 2005; van
Eijk et al., 2008; Spence, 2010). Because the effect in our experi-
ment is primarily a lateral shift in the curve (i.e., total simultaneity
judgments did not change), a criterion bias cannot explain these
results.
Increased simultaneity immediately following the motor act
Although we have made the argument that a shift of the auditory
timeline best explains our findings (in other words, recalibrated
expectations of the timing of the beep), we also noted that in
the 150 ms immediately following action, changes in simultaneity
judgments between the Passive and Active conditions were much
larger than those in the corresponding last three offsets (note the
larger separation of the Passive and Active curves on the left side vs.
the right side; Figures 3A,B). This led us to reason that for equally
large offsets between flash and beep (e.g., −150 or +150 ms),
proximity to the motor act may have influenced the perception
of simultaneity of the two sensory events. We now turn to two
possible explanations for this asymmetry.
Many studies of motor-sensory recalibration have shown that
the strength of the shift between action and effect dissipates with
longer delays between action and feedback (Eagleman and Hol-
combe, 2002; Haggard et al., 2002; Stetson et al., 2006; Heron et al.,
2009; Cravo et al., 2011; Arnold et al., 2012; but see Humphreys and
Buehner, 2009). Relatedly, Wenke and Haggard (2009) have pro-
vided evidence that participants are more likely to judge two tactile
events as simultaneous when they are presented within a 150 ms
window after a key press; there is no effect for events occurring
later than this window. According to Wenke and Haggard (2009),
recalibration models cannot account for this data; instead, it is
viewed as evidence in favor of a clock-rate model. In their view,
intentional actions “transiently slow down an internal clock” and
“two shocks are thus more likely to fall within a single clock period,
impairing temporal discrimination” (Wenke and Haggard, 2009).
We suggest an alternative interpretation of these results that both
accords with the motor-sensory recalibration framework and is
supported by our present data in Figure 3.
In addition to having a prior expectation that the sensory con-
sequences of actions should occur without delay (Stetson et al.,
2006), we hypothesize that the perceptual system also interprets
events occurring at short delays after an action as sensory con-
sequences of the action (Hume, 1748; Eagleman and Holcombe,
2002). Moreover, if participants believe that two sensory events
originate from a common source, they are more likely to perceive
those events as simultaneous with one another (Zampini et al.,
2005; van Wassenhove et al., 2007; Stevenson et al., 2012) – in
the context of the current study, the common source is their own
action. Therefore, we hypothesize that two sensory events closely
following a motor act are more likely to be interpreted as (1) caused
by the agent, and (2) simultaneous with one another.
Studies of intentional binding have suggested that changes
in the timing of sensory events are driven by both a predictive
motor component (Haggard et al., 2002; Stetson et al., 2006) and
a postdictive inferential mechanism (Moore and Haggard, 2008;
Buehner, 2010). These two information sources both contribute
to conscious awareness and appear to be weighted in a Bayesian
manner according to their reliability. In our experiment, relatively
higher rates of simultaneity were observed when the beep and
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FIGURE 3 | Motor-sensory recalibration. (A) In the Near condition, the
point of subjective simultaneity (PSS, calculated as the center of mass of
the simultaneity curves) was −14 ms±4 (Passive) and −33 ms±5
(Active). The auditory stimulus was perceived as occurring earlier in time in
the Active condition by approximately 18 ms [t (17)=−3.50, p<0.01]. The
difference in the number of simultaneity judgments between conditions
was not significant [t (17)=0.84, p= 0.41] (B) In the Far condition, the PSS
was −16 ms±4 (Passive) and −41 ms±7 (Active). The auditory stimulus
was perceived as occurring earlier in time in the Active condition by
approximately 25 ms [t (17)=−4.04, p<0.01]. The difference in the
number of simultaneity judgments between conditions was not significant
[t (17)=1.11, p=0.28].
the flash occurred in close proximity to the motor act, paralleling
the findings of Wenke and Haggard (2009). Due to its unpre-
dictability, the flash was presumably not subject to motor-sensory
shifts (Cravo et al., 2011). Rather, we propose that when the flash
occurred shortly after the motor act, postdictive inferential mech-
anisms linked both sensory events to the action, thereby leading to
increased simultaneity judgments. The longer the delay between
a button press and sensory feedback, the less likely the brain is
to claim authorship over the event and judge the two events as
simultaneous (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002).
SIMULTANEITY CONSTANCY
No compensation for distance from the participant
Contrary to previous reports (Sugita and Suzuki, 2003; Kopinska
and Harris, 2004; Alais and Carlile, 2005) we find no evidence for
compensation of auditory travel time when stimuli are presented
at different distances. Expressed as arrival time at the participant’s
sensory organs, the PSS was−14 ms in the Near Passive condition
and −33 ms in the Near Active condition (Figure 4A). If partici-
pants were able to judge the timing of the events as they are leaving
the source, the PSS should have shifted to the left in both of the
Far conditions by approximately 87 ms (sound takes ∼87 ms to
travel 30 m). Thus, compensation for distance-induced auditory
delays would have predicted a PSS of−101 ms (−14–87 ms) in the
Far Passive condition, and−120 ms in the (−33–87 ms) in the Far
Active condition. Instead, we found that stimulus travel times map
nearly perfectly onto perceptual time. We will return to this point
below, in the Discussion.
Does uncertainty in source localization decrease judgments of
simultaneity?
Previous studies have suggested that localization and synchrony
judgments are dependent on the spatial and temporal properties
of the stimulus (Bertelson and Aschersleben, 2003; Hairston
et al., 2003; Alais and Burr, 2004; Bertelson and de Gelder,
2004; Zampini et al., 2005; Körding et al., 2007; Shams and
Beierholm, 2010; Heron et al., 2012; Stevenson et al., 2012). In
our results a relatively higher (although non-significant) num-
ber of overall simultaneity judgments were made when partic-
ipants were seated close to the stimuli (Figure 4B). Although
no explicit measures of localization were recorded, we suspect
this difference occurred because participants had abundant audi-
tory and visual cues with which to localize the sensory events
in the Near condition. They could thus be certain that both
the beep and the flash were emanating from the same source
(Spence et al., 2003; Gepshtein et al., 2005; Körding et al., 2007;
van Wassenhove et al., 2007; Shams and Beierholm, 2010). The
greater distance of 30 m may have increased the uncertainty asso-
ciated with participants’ localization judgments. While studies
have shown contraction of spatial locations for causally related
events (Buehner and Humphreys, 2010), the influence of dis-
tance on judgments of causality (and hence simultaneity) is a
largely unexplored question and will be investigated in future
studies.
PERCEPTUAL AFTEREFFECTS
If brains calibrate time perception primarily through motor inter-
action with the world (see Introduction) one might expect the
effects of adaptation to a fixed delay to persist when that delay
is taken away (Cunningham et al., 2001; Kennedy et al., 2009).
Indeed, the illusory reversal of action and effect (Stetson et al.,
2006) is made possible by just such persistence. However, the way
in which temporal judgments are affected when the motor act itself
is removed following adaptation in unknown. Studies of adapta-
tion to spatial misalignment (Redding and Wallace, 1993), as well
as recalibration with inter-sensory stimuli (Fujisaki et al., 2004),
suggest that residual perceptual aftereffects might exist. To address
this possibility, we had a subset of our participants (n= 10) run
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FIGURE 4 | Compensation for source distance? (A) Participant’s
PSS were not significantly different between the near and far
conditions [Passive, t (34)=−0.36, p=0.72; and Active,
t (34)=−1.04, p=0.30]. However, active control over a distal event
can compensate for distance-induced auditory delays [t (17)=−4.04,
p<0.01]. (B) Although it was not significant, we did observe a trend
toward increased overall simultaneity at the Near location. We
speculate that this may be driven by the ease of source localization
when the stimuli are presented up close, and could be clarified with a
higher sample size in the future.
an additional Passive block (Near condition) following the Active
block.
We found that the effects of motor-sensory recalibration remain
for∼35 trials before dissipating (Figure 5). The uncoupling from
the motor timeline seems to allow the auditory and visual time-
lines to shift fairly quickly back into alignment. This finding has
parallels in the rapid pace at which motor-sensory recalibration
establishes itself, reaching full magnitude within ∼20 trials (Stet-
son et al., 2006). The speeds with which these shifts in timing
take place illustrate the central role of causality in our perceptual
interpretation of the world. In fact, recent experiments on cross-
sensory recalibration have found shifts following exposure to a
single presentation of only a few milliseconds (Wozny and Shams,
2011).
DISCUSSION
The results of our experiments yield three insights. First, the shift
in the timing of the auditory stimulus in relation to the visual stim-
ulus contradicts previous explanations of intentional binding, par-
ticularly a clock-rate model, and instead supports the hypothesis of
multiple coexisting timelines in the brain. Second, motor-sensory
recalibration seems to be driven by both predictive motor sig-
nals and postdictive inferential mechanisms. Because of constantly
changing neural delays and the critical importance of uncover-
ing causal relationships, the brain utilizes a flexible and adaptive
mechanism, rather than simple neural latencies, to construct the
timing of events. Third, changes in observer-stimulus distance,
resulting in differences in the arrival time of sight and sound,
are not taken into account when participants make simultaneity
FIGURE 5 |The effect of motor-sensory recalibration persists in a
subsequent passive Block.This aftereffect lasts for ∼35–40 trials. Point of
subjective simultaneity (PSS) was calculated over a window size of 25
trials, with the window shifting in increments of 8 trials. Width of line
indicates SEM.
judgments. However, active control over a distal event can result
in compensation for the slower speed of sound.
In addition, we tentatively suggest that differences in source
localization between the Near and Far conditions may have
affected the size of the window that people use to make judgments
of synchrony.
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TIME TO THROW OUT THE CLOCK?
For over 50 years the dominant paradigm in time perception
research has posited the existence of a single, central-clock respon-
sible for constructing a single temporal representation of the
outside world (Creelman, 1962; Treisman, 1963; Allan and Kristof-
ferson, 1974; Gibbon et al., 1984). Distortions in duration and
timing are accounted for by increasing or decreasing the amount of
“ticks” that accumulate during a given interval. Despite an absence
of physiological evidence, a majority of findings in the field still
rely on this putative clock to explain their results (Wittmann, 1999;
Hodinott-Hill et al., 2002; Tse et al., 2004; Morrone et al., 2005;
Kanai et al., 2006; Wearden, 2008; New and Scholl, 2009; Wen-
cil et al., 2010). In the intentional binding literature, performing
an action is said to “slow down an internal clock, in anticipation
of the effect of the action” (Wenke and Haggard, 2009). In other
words, because of fewer clock cycles, the interval between action
and effects becomes compressed.
Such a model is incapable of explaining the results of our
experiment. If a compression of the interval separating action
and effect were responsible for the shift in motor-sensory tim-
ing, the beep and the flash would both have shifted toward the
motor act by the same amount (Figure 1C), perhaps resulting in
more synchrony in the Active condition. That is, a single slowed
clock would affect both sensory consequences equally. Instead,
we found that different sensory modalities were able to shift
individually in relation to the motor act, and the propensity of
participants to make judgments of simultaneity was unaltered
between the Passive and Active conditions. Replicating previous
studies (Haggard et al., 2002), an auditory stimulus occurring at
a predictable delay was perceived as occurring closer in time to
the action which caused it. This shift occurred, however, with-
out a concomitant change in the timing of the paired visual
stimulus. Rather than time itself being stretched or shrunk, the
sensory signals themselves were realigned in subjective time. We
also suggest that such a process operates implicitly and below
the level of awareness. Participants questioned after the Active
block reported being unaware of which stimuli was occurring at a
constant delay.
We propose that our results are best explained by an appeal
to multiple representations of time that coexist within the brain.
Trapped by the assumption of a Cartesian theater in which sensory
input is passively recorded (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992), mod-
ern theories of brain time have largely avoided this framework.
Mounting evidence, however, suggests that a single clock-rate
model of perceptual time is untenable (Eagleman, 2008). Instead,
different aspects of time appear to be underpinned by separate
neural mechanisms that sometimes act in concert, but are not
required to do so (Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009).
Previous work has provided compelling evidence for the exis-
tence of independent motor and sensory timelines in the brain
(Ivry, 1996; Ivry and Richardson, 2002; Stetson et al., 2006; Arnold
and Yarrow, 2011). The current experiment extends these find-
ings and shows that individual sensory modalities have their own
adjustable timelines. If each sense calibrates against motor acts,
this calibrates them in relation to each other as well. Neither the
illusory reversal of action and effect (Stetson et al., 2006), nor the
sensory specific modulation of cross-modal simultaneity observed
here can be explained by a clock-rate model. In light of evidence
from other labs (Westheimer, 1999; Yarrow et al., 2004; Morrone
et al., 2005; Johnston et al., 2006; Burr et al., 2007; van Wassenhove
et al., 2008; Alais and Cass, 2010; Marinovic and Arnold, 2012), we
suggest that a paradigm shift is underway within the field of time
perception. Discarding the notion of a single central timer allows
for novel frameworks and predictions (Westheimer, 1999; Körd-
ing et al., 2007; Ivry and Schlerf, 2008; Buhusi and Meck, 2009;
Buonomano and Maass, 2009; Eagleman and Pariyadath, 2009;
van Wassenhove, 2009; Johnston, 2010; Ahrens and Sahani, 2011;
Cai et al., 2012; Liverence and Scholl, 2012; Pacer and Griffiths,
2012) that will force us to think critically about what it means for
time to be represented in the brain.
ACTIONS CALIBRATE TIME PERCEPTION
Experiments have suggested that our experience of the tempo-
ral properties of an event are a result of both predictive (Stetson
et al., 2006) and postdictive or inferential mechanisms (Eagleman
and Sejnowski, 2000). Retrospective awareness has been reported
for both sensory (Choi and Scholl, 2006) and motor (Moore and
Haggard, 2008) events and seems to operate over a window 250 ms
into the future (Moore et al., 2009). In our experiment, the largest
shifts between Passive and Active blocks occurred in the 150 ms
immediately following the action. A similar effect, increased simul-
taneity judgments of two tactile stimuli in a window 150 ms after
an action, has been taken as decisive evidence against the motor-
sensory recalibration model (Wenke and Haggard, 2009). The
authors assume that recalibration only affects when in time events
occur, as opposed to affecting the judgment criteria for synchrony.
That explanation ignores the causal component that serves as the
foundation of our framework. Instead of a slowed clock, we sug-
gest that when a beep and the flash occur in a brief window after
the motor action, the brain becomes more likely to claim author-
ship over the sensory consequences. Because of a prior assumption
that sensory consequences of an action should arrive without delay,
events causally related to the action are more likely to be judged
as simultaneous. Crucially, the influence of the motor signal is
limited by its predictive ability, which decays over time.
We have previously suggested that the brain must continu-
ally refine its expectations about the normal temporal relation-
ship between outgoing actions and incoming sensations (Stetson
et al., 2006; Eagleman, 2008). In this framework, motor interac-
tion with the world calibrates expectations about the timing of
feedback from the different sensory channels. These expectations
about sensory timing can subsequently be employed when pas-
sively interpreting events in the world (i.e., events that were not
self-caused). This theoretical framework explicitly predicts that
perceptual aftereffects should be observed even in the absence
of action, and this is indeed what we found (Figure 5). While
these temporal aftereffects are not necessarily inconsistent with
an intentional binding model, they are an unambiguous predic-
tion of the motor-sensory recalibration model (Stetson et al.,
2006; Eagleman, 2008; Cai et al., 2012). Note that the afteref-
fects we found only lasted ∼35–40 trials into the Passive block;
we hypothesize this could be extended by longer training in the
Active condition, and our future experiments will test this pre-
diction. Finally, it is interesting to note that our results appear
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similar, at least on the surface, to reaching aftereffects observed
following exposure to spatial misalignment during prism adapta-
tion (Redding et al., 2005). The links between these two research
traditions (recalibration to misalignment in time or in space) has
only begun to be investigated (Kennedy et al., 2009; Cai et al., 2012)
and more studies are needed to elucidate common principles and
interactions.
ACTIONS COMPENSATE FOR DISTANCE-INDUCED AUDITORY DELAYS
Our results present a picture in which active control over a dis-
tant audio-visual event can modulate its perceived simultaneity.
A person observing fireworks at a distance of 30 m (Far con-
dition) would notice a temporal asynchrony between the bang
and flash, due to the slower velocity of sound. If that same
observer were given a chance to control the onset of the fire-
works however, the bang and flash would be more likely to be
perceived as a unitary event. Although this appears to support
the hypothesis that brains can compensate for delays in audi-
tory travel times, the mechanism is different from that originally
proposed.
Beginning with Engel and Dougherty (1971), several studies
have suggested that the brain is able to integrate information
about distance (whether visual, auditory, or both) to calibrate
simultaneity (Sugita and Suzuki, 2003; Kopinska and Harris, 2004;
Alais and Carlile, 2005). The temporal location of an integra-
tion window is purportedly actively manipulated by the brain
depending on the distance of the visible sound source (Spence
and Squire, 2003; Sugita and Suzuki, 2003). The window does not
widen in size but rather shifts along a timeline. Some authors
have interpreted this as reflecting a perceptual mechanism sim-
ilar to size constancy, a phenomenon wherein the perceived size
of an object is maintained despite variations in the retinal infor-
mation (Gregory, 1963; Kopinska and Harris, 2004; Harris et al.,
2010). Such constancies are common for other perceptual attrib-
utes including color, brightness, shape, and location (Palmer,
1999).
Our results conflict with these studies and show that the differ-
ential velocities of sound and light map nearly directly onto the
perceived timing of audio-visual events (Figure 4). Several other
experiments have questioned the notion of active compensation
for source distance and our results concord with these studies
(Stone et al., 2001; Lewald and Guski, 2004; Arnold et al., 2005;
Heron et al., 2007). As others have pointed out, such a mech-
anism would require calculations utilizing absolute distance as
well as the speed of sound in different environmental settings
(Arnold et al., 2005; Heron et al., 2007). In addition to the compu-
tational complexity of such a task, it is not apparent why the brain
would want to explicitly represent such variables in the first place.
Methodological differences between the studies, including the use
of a binary forced choice task (Sugita and Suzuki, 2003; Kopin-
ska and Harris, 2004; Arnold et al., 2005), sound presentations
through headphones (Sugita and Suzuki, 2003), requirements to
use one’s imagination (Sugita and Suzuki, 2003), and a lack of
physical distance cues (Alais and Carlile, 2005) may have con-
tributed to biased reporting. In line with Arnold et al. (2005), we
interpret studies showing active compensation as likely deriving
from cognitive strategies tapping into participant’s knowledge
about the slower speed of sound in the physical world. The use
of simultaneity judgments in our experiment limited the effects of
response biases and made any attempt to use a cognitive strategy
problematic.
While our results did not provide evidence of compensa-
tion for distance-induced auditory delays, we did find differences
between the Near and Far conditions in participant’s procliv-
ity to make simultaneity judgments (Figure 4B). Rather than a
moveable window shifting along a timeline (Sugita and Suzuki,
2003) our results point toward an integration period that can
expand or shrink depending on various spatial and temporal
factors of the stimulus. Previous research has suggested that the
impression of a plausible unitary event (Guski and Troje, 2003),
driven by the temporal synchrony and spatial coincidence of
cross-modal stimuli (Körding et al., 2007; van Wassenhove et al.,
2007; Shams and Beierholm, 2010; Stevenson et al., 2012), can
lead to higher causality ratings and thus increased simultaneity
judgments. Our results suggest that differences in source local-
ization caused by changes in distance may also contribute to
the perception of a single causal event. Participants were more
likely, in both the Passive and Active cases, to judge audio-
visual pairings as simultaneous if they were presented directly
in front of them (Near condition). Although the brightness of
the flash and the loudness of the beep were matched in the
Far condition, participants appeared to be less certain that the
audio-visual event was emanating from a single location. No
other study, to our knowledge, has reported how differences in
distance affect the size of the window for cross-modal integra-
tion. Future experiments might investigate the flexibility of our
causal perception by independently varying the stimulus distances
of simultaneously presented auditory and visual stimuli. Such
experiments would contribute to a better understanding of the
relative roles of perceptual and cognitive factors in our causal
judgments.
CONCLUSION
The conventional framework for understanding temporal per-
ception has focused on how the brain passively registers a feed-
forward flow of sensory input. We suggest instead that the timing
of events is actively constructed by the brain through disparate
mechanisms which can be teased apart with experimentation. Cru-
cial to this construction is the brain’s ability to distinguish what
changes in the environment it is responsible for causing. Because
of the difficulty and importance of making such inferences, timing
judgments are flexible and dynamically calibrated in order to keep
causality assessments accurate. Our motor actions have a special
role to play in modulating the expectations associated with sensory
feedback and hence perception. While the influence of motor sig-
nals on our spatial representation of the world is well established,
contributions to temporal perception are still largely unexplored
and warrant further investigation.
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